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Abstract—Software vulnerabilities have a large negative impact on the software systems that we depend on daily. Reports on software
vulnerabilities always paint a grim picture, with some reports showing that 83% of organizations depend on vulnerable software.
However, our experience leads us to believe that, in the grand scheme of things, these software vulnerabilities may have less impact
than what is reported.
Therefore, we perform a study to better understand the threat of npm vulnerable packages used in Node.js applications. We define
three threat levels for vulnerabilities in packages, based on their lifecycle, where a package vulnerability is assigned a low threat level if
it was hidden or still unknown at the time it was used in the dependent application (t), medium threat level if the vulnerability was
reported but not yet published at t, and high if it was publicly announced at t. Then, we perform an empirical study involving 6,673
real-world, active, and mature open source Node.js applications. Our findings show that although 67.93% of the examined applications
depend on at least one vulnerable package, 94.91% of the vulnerable packages in those affected applications are classified as having
low threat. Moreover, we find that in the case of vulnerable packages classified as having high threat, it is the application’s lack of
updating that makes them vulnerable, i.e., it is not the existence of the vulnerability that is the real problem. Furthermore, we verify our
findings at different stages of the application’s lifetime and find that our findings still hold. Our study argues that when it comes to
software vulnerabilities, things may not be as bad as they seem and that considering vulnerability threat is key.
Index Terms—Packages, npm Ecosystem, Vulnerabilities, Mining Software Repository
F
1 INTRODUCTION
The existence of a software vulnerability in a software sys-
tem is a major concern for software projects. These vulnera-
bilities can cause unimaginable damage for an organization
if exploited. In fact, there are many examples of such cases.
One such example is the Equifax cybersecurity incident [1],
where a vulnerability in Apache Struts led to unauthorized
access to consumers’ personal information and credit card
numbers.
To make matters even worse, the recent popularity
of software ecosystems has only magnified the problem.
Specifically, most software systems today have many direct
and transitive dependencies, which increases the risk of
a vulnerability in a software project. Contrast Security, a
software security company, reported that 80% of the code
written in today’s applications depend on external pack-
ages, and approximately one fourth of package downloads
have known vulnerabilities [2]. Furthermore, a recent report
by Snyk.io showed that 83% of organizations use vulnerable
packages and that 77% of the 430,000 websites crawled by
them, run at least one vulnerable JavaScript package [3].
These reported figures are worrisome given our everyday
dependence on software systems.
However, although these vulnerability reports are wor-
rying, they impact a very tiny fraction of existing software
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systems [4], [5]. For example, a recent study manually
analysed 60 projects that depend on high severity vulner-
abilities, and found that 73.3% of them were actually safe
because they didn’t make use of the vulnerable functionality
of their dependencies [5].
Hence, we argue that not all vulnerabilities are equal. To
get the real picture, one needs to take into consideration the
potential threat of a software vulnerability. Formally defined,
the threat of a vulnerability is the potential danger to exploit
a vulnerability in order to breach security and cause possible
harm [6].
The main goal of our study is to examine the degree
that applications rely on vulnerable dependencies and un-
derstand how threatening such vulnerable dependencies
really are. To achieve our goal, we first provide a threat
classification for the software vulnerabilities based on their
lifecycle. Note that this is a post-mortem classification, using
information only available after the fact, for the purpose of
evaluating the threat of dependency vulnerabilities in the
dependent applications. We classify software vulnerabilities
into three main threat levels: low threat, indicating that a
vulnerability that affects a dependency was not discovered
(reported) yet at a specific point in the application lifecycle;
medium threat, indicating that a vulnerability was discovered
but not yet published (publicly announced); high threat,
indicating a vulnerability has been published.
We use our classification and perform an empirical study
involving 6,673 real-world, active, and mature open source
Node.js applications, of which more than half have at least
one vulnerable dependency. We use these classifications to
examine (RQ1) how threatening vulnerable dependencies
in the dependent applications really are, (RQ2) how the
threat levels of vulnerable dependencies evolve through the
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applications development history, and (RQ3) why some ap-
plications end up depending on high threat vulnerabilities
in order to better understand how we can mitigate such
issues.
Our findings show that although 67.93% of the exam-
ined applications have (in one of their recent versions) at
least one vulnerable dependency, 94.91% of the vulnerable
dependencies in these applications are classified as having
low threat (RQ1). Moreover, as applications evolve, they
are more likely to depend on vulnerable dependencies,
however, most of the vulnerabilities have a low threat level
(RQ2). Lastly, we find that the vast majority (90.8%) of the
high threat dependency vulnerabilities were caused by the
applications, i.e., vulnerable dependencies had an available
vulnerability fix but the applications did not update to a
newer (safer) version of the vulnerable dependency (RQ3).
As a key contribution, we provide an empirically-sound
evidence regarding the degree to which Node.js application
projects rely on npm vulnerable dependencies and how
such vulnerable dependencies are threatening through ap-
plications development history, while also discussing the
implications of our findings to researchers and practitioners.
Besides, we provide an approach to identify vulnerable
dependencies in a Node.js application at a given point
in time, taking into consideration our vulnerability threat
classification. Other researchers analysing vulnerabilities in
npm dependencies can reuse it. Finally, we provide a repli-
cation package comprising the techniques and dataset that
we used in this study as a means to bootstrap other studies
in the area.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
introduces our vulnerability classification used in this study.
Section 3 describes how npm manages dependencies in
Node.js applications. Section 4 describes our case study
design. Section 5 presents our results. Section 6 discusses
how our results lead to direct implications to researchers
and practitioners. Section 7 discusses the related work.
Section 8 presents the threats to validity. Section 9 concludes
our paper.
2 CLASSIFYING VULNERABILITIES
In this section, we explain the different stages a vulnerability
goes through in its lifecycle. Then, we define our threat
levels for vulnerabilities using the different stages that a
vulnerability goes through during its lifecycle.
2.1 Vulnerability Lifecycle
A software vulnerability is a weakness that allows unautho-
rized actions and/or access to be performed. These actions
are typically used to break through the system and violate
its security policies [6], [7]. A vulnerability threat is a potential
danger to exploit a vulnerability in order to breach security
and cause possible harm [6]. As shown in Figure 1, typically,
and with emphasis on vulnerabilities in the Node Package
Manager (npm ecosystem), a vulnerability goes through a
number of different stages [8].
• Introduction. This is when the software vulnerability
is first introduced into the code. At this stage, no one
really knows about its existence, assuming that the in-
troduction is not malicious. Hence, the potential threat
of the vulnerability is quite low.
• Discovery (report). When a vulnerability is discovered,
it must be reported to the npm security team. The npm
team investigates to ensure that the reported vulnera-
bility is legitimate. At this stage, only the security team
and the reporter of the vulnerability know about its
existence. The potential threat at this stage is still low.
• Notification. Once the reported vulnerability is con-
firmed, the security team triages the vulnerability and
notifies the vulnerable package maintainers. At this
stage, only the reporter, npm team, and package main-
tainers know about the vulnerability, hence its potential
threat to be exploited remains low.
• Publication without a known fix. Once the package
maintainers are notified, they have 45 days before npm
publishes the vulnerability publicly. Alongside with
publishing the vulnerability, the npm team may also
publish a proof-of-concept showing how the vulnera-
bility can be exploited. At this stage, the vulnerability
is known publicly and its potential threat is high.
• Publication with a fix. Another (and more common)
way that a vulnerability can be published is when a
fix is provided by the package maintainers. If a fix
is provided (before 45 days), then npm publishes the
vulnerability along with the version of the package that
fixes the vulnerability. At this stage, the potential threat
is not as high as when a no fix is provided, but now the
onus is on the application maintainers to make sure that
they pull in the latest fixes, otherwise they are risking
being exploited.
Typically, the vulnerability publish date is after the re-
port and notification dates. It is important to note that
although the aforementioned stages are generally sequen-
tial, we do see cases where it is not. For example, in some
cases we see vulnerabilities with a fix date that precedes its
reporting or publication date. The race between developers
and attackers starts as soon as a vulnerability is discovered.
We use the different stages of a vulnerability to examine the
potential threat of software vulnerabilities next.
2.2 Threat Levels
As shown earlier, the different stages that a vulnerability
goes through significantly impact its threat. Hence, our
study is based on the idea that vulnerabilities should be
examined while taking their threat into consideration as the
vulnerability timing makes them hard to exploit. We use the
various stages to ground our argument and define three
specific threat levels:
1) Low threat - before discovery (report). Since very
little (or nothing at all) is known about a vulnerability
before it is found, i.e., vulnerabilities are hidden in the
applications, we believe that its potential threats and
chances of being exploited are very low. Hence, we
classify all vulnerabilities at this stage as having low
threat.
2) Medium threat - after discovery & before publication:
Once a vulnerability has been discovered, there is po-
tential that others may also know about it. Moreover,
since at this stage the public is still not aware of the
vulnerability, the vulnerability might be exploited by
people who know about it somehow and have the ca-
Figure 1: Classification of threats over the vulnerability lifecy-
cle.
pability to exploit it. Hence, we classify vulnerabilities
at this stage as having medium threat.
3) High threat - after publication: After publication this
is the time when the chance of exploitability is highest.
Of course, if a fix is provided, then the risk is lower,
however, if the application does not update then it still
faces a major risk of being exploited. If a fix is not
provided, then all applications are at a very high risk
of being exploited, hence, we classify all vulnerabilities
at this stage as having high threat.
3 NPM DEPENDENCY MANAGEMENT
We use our defined threat levels to examine vulnerable
dependencies in Node.js applications. Since determining
vulnerable dependencies heavily relies on the management
of the dependencies and how they are resolved, in this
section, we highlight how npm dependency management
works.
Node Packages Manager (npm) is the main package
manager used by Node.js applications to manage their
dependencies [9]. npm has a registry where packages are
published and maintained. To date, npm registry hosts more
than 1.3M packages, and has had the highest growth rate
in terms of packages amongst all known programming
languages [10].
To determine the threat of vulnerable dependencies in
Node.js applications, we need to understand two impor-
tant mechanisms of the npm ecosystem: 1) how Node.js
applications specify their npm dependencies and 2) how
npm resolves a dependency version, i.e., find the depen-
dency version to install in a Node.js application. Node.js
applications specify their dependencies in a JSON-format
file, called package.json, which lists the dependencies and
their versioning constraints. The versioning constraint is
a convention to specify the dependency version(s) of the
package that an application is willing to depend upon. The
version constraints can be static, requiring a specific version
of the dependency (e.g., “P:1.0.0” ), or dynamic specifying
a range of versions of the dependency (e.g., “P:>1.0.0”).
Typically, developers use dynamic versioning constraints
if they want to install the latest version of a dependency,
allowing them to get the latest updates/security fixes of
the package. When a dynamic version is used, the resolved
version (i.e., the actual version) corresponds to the latest
installable version that satisfies the constraint [11].
Node.js applications can specify two sets of dependen-
cies in their package.json file: development and produc-
tion dependencies. Development dependencies are installed
only on development environments, and consequently, is-
sues that may arise from them (e.g., vulnerabilities and
bugs) have no impact on production environments. On the
other hand, production dependencies (also called runtime
dependencies) are installed on both production and de-
velopment environments. In our work, we only consider
production dependencies in our analysis since they are the
ones that impact the production environment [12].
4 CASE STUDY DESIGN
To examine the degree to which applications rely on vul-
nerable dependencies and how threatening such vulnerable
dependencies are within the applications, we study a large
dataset of mature and active Node.js applications that use
external dependencies. First, we describe our data collection
in Section 4.1. Then, in Section 4.2 we explain how we
use our threat levels to identify and classify the vulnerable
dependencies in the Node.js applications. We leverage the
collected data to answer the following research questions.
• RQ1: How are the threat levels of vulnerable dependen-
cies distributed in the studied Node.js applications?
• RQ2: How does the distribution of the threat levels
change as the studied applications evolve?
• RQ3: Who is responsible for the dependence on high
threat vulnerable dependencies?
4.1 Data Collection
Our study examines vulnerable dependencies in Node.js
applications. We chose to focus on Javascript due to its wide
popularity amongst the development community [13].
Packages vs. Applications. The software community classi-
fies JavaScript projects into two categories: 1) packages, also
referred to as libraries, which are included in other applica-
tions using dependency management tools to help facilitate
and speed up development. Packages are referred to as
”dependencies” of an application. 2) applications are stan-
dalone software projects, which are distinct from libraries,
where they are not distributed via a package manager and
are typically applications for clients and end users rather
than components to build upon. As mentioned before, the
Node.js applications mainly state the packages they depend
on (i.e., dependencies) in a file called package.json.
To perform our study, we leverage two datasets:
(1) Node.js applications that use npm to manage their
dependencies, and (2) Security vulnerabilities that affect
npm packages. To do so, we (i) obtain the Node.js
applications from GitHub, (ii) extract their dependencies,
and (iii) obtain the security vulnerabilities for npm
packages from npm advisories [14]. The dataset collection
took place during May and June of 2019.
(i) Applications Dataset. To analyse a large number of open
source JavaScript applications that depend on npm pack-
ages and obtain insights on their security vulnerabilities,
we mine the GHTorrent dataset [15] and extract informa-
tion about all Node.js applications hosted on GitHub. The
GHTorrent dataset contains a total of 7,863,361 JavaScript
projects hosted on GitHub, of which 2,289,130 use npm
as their package management platform (i.e., these projects
contain a file called package.json). Moreover, since both
Node.js packages and applications can use GitHub as their de-
velopment repository, and our applications dataset should
only contain Node.js applications, we filter out the GitHub
projects that are actually npm packages by checking their
GitHub URL on the npm registry. The main reason that
we focused on applications and not packages is because
packages become exploitable only when used and deployed
in an application, i.e., packages do not reside on their own
in production, they should be part of applications that make
use of them. This filtering excludes 328,343 projects from our
list of GitHub projects as they are identified as packages and
not applications.
As shown in previous studies [16], [17], some projects
on GitHub are immature, hence, to make this study more
reliable we refined the dataset using additional filtering
criteria to eliminate such immature projects. In particular,
we gather applications that satisfy all the following criteria:
• Non-forked applications, as we do not want to have
duplicated project history to bias our analysis.
• Applications that depend upon more than two depen-
dencies.
• Applications that have at least 100 commits by more
than two contributors, which indicates a minimal level
of commit activity.
• Applications that have had their creation date (first
commit) before January 1st 2017. Since vulnerabilities
take on median 3 years to be discovered [18], appli-
cations in our dataset need to have a development
history long enough to have had a chance for their
vulnerabilities to be discovered.
• Applications that have had their latest commit after
January 1st 2017, as we want to analyze applications
that had some level of development in the last 3 years.
After applying these refinement criteria, we end up
with 6,673 Node.js applications that make use of npm
packages. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics on the
selected Node.js applications in our dataset. Overall,
the applications in our dataset have a rich development
history (a median of 213 commits made by 4 developers
and 1,657 days of development lifespan) and make ample
use of external dependencies (a median of 11 dependencies).
(ii) Application Dependencies. After obtaining the
applications dataset, we want to extract the history of
dependency changes of all applications. This is necessary
to identify the exact dependency versions that would be
installed by the application at any specific point-in-time.
As mentioned in Section 3, Node.js applications specify
their dependencies in the package.json file, which contains
the dependency list, containing the dependent upon
packages and their respective version constraints. Hence,
we extract all changes that touched the package.json file
and associate each commit hash and commit date to their
respective package.json dependency list, creating a history
of dependency changes for all applications. Note that these
dependencies are not yet resolved, that is, we only have the
version constraints (not the versions) for the dependencies
of each application.
(iii) NPM Advisories Dataset. To identify Node.js applica-
tions that depend on vulnerable packages, we need to collect
Table 1: Statistics of the 6,673 studied Node.js applications.
Metric Min. Median(x¯) Mean(µ) Max.
Commits 100 213 384.60 53,872
Dependencies 3 11 14.93 114
Developers 3 4 5.33 52
Lifespan (in days) 151 1,657 1,730.07 3,575
Table 2: Descriptive statistics on the npm advisories dataset.
Vulnerability reports 642
Vulnerable packages 589
Versions of vulnerable packages 26,462
Affected versions by vulnerability 13,868
information on npm vulnerable packages. We resort to the
NPM advisories registry to obtain the required information
about all npm vulnerable packages [14]. The npm advisories
dataset is the official registry for npm vulnerability reports,
which contains a number of JavaScript vulnerabilities, spe-
cific to the Node.js-platform packages.
This dataset provides several kinds of information about
vulnerable packages relevant to our study. Each report has
the affected package name, the package versions affected by
the vulnerability, and the versions in which the vulnerabiliy
was fixed (safe versions). The report also contains both
the vulnerability discovered (reported) time and published
time, which we use in our approach for identifying and clas-
sifying vulnerabilities (Section 4.2). Note that a vulnerable
package could be affected by several vulnerabilities (i.e.,
a vulnerable package appears with different vulnerability
reports due to different vulnerability types).
Our initial dataset contains 654 security reports that
cover 601 vulnerable packages. Following the criteria filtra-
tion process applied by Decan et al. [18], we removed 12 vul-
nerable packages of the type ”Malicious Package”, because
they do not actually introduce vulnerable code. These vul-
nerabilities are packages with names close to popular pack-
ages (a.k.a. typo-squatting) in an attempt to deceive users at
installing harmful packages. The 12 vulnerable packages ac-
count for 12 vulnerability reports. At the end of this filtering
process, we are left with 642 security vulnerabilities reports
affecting 589 distinct vulnerable packages. These packages
have combined 26,462 distinct package versions of which
13,868 are affected by vulnerabilities from our report. Table 2
shows the summary statistics for vulnerability reports on
npm packages.
4.2 Identifying and Classifying Vulnerable Dependen-
cies in Node.js Applications
To classify the threat level of vulnerable dependencies at
a specific point in the development history of a Node.js
application, which we refer to as the analyzed snapshot time,
we leverage 3-step approach. Figure 2 provides an overview
of our approach, which we detail below:
Step 1. Extract dependencies and resolve versions. The
goal of this step is to extract applications dependencies
and find the actual dependency version installed at the
analyzed snapshot time. For each application, we extract
the dependency list (with the versioning constraints) at that
snapshot time from the history of dependency changes.
After that, to find the actual version of each dependency
at the analyzed snapshot, we utilize the semver tool [19]
that is used by npm to find the latest version that satisfies
Applications 
Dataset
Extract 
dependencies and 
resolve versions
Identify vulnerable 
dependency 
versions
Identify threat levels 
of vulnerable 
versions
Figure 2: Approach for identifying and classifying vulnerable dependencies in Node.js applications.
the versioning constraint, with an additional restriction
that the satisfying version should have been released (in
the npm registry) before the application snapshot time. For
example, an application can specify a versioning constraint
(“P:>1.0.0”) at the snapshot May 2016. Hence, the actual
installed version is the latest version that is greater than
1.0.0 and also has been released in the npm registry before
May 2016. This step allows us to find the installed version
of the dependency at the analyzed snapshot time.
Step 2. Identify vulnerable dependency versions. After
determining the resolved (and presumably installed)
version at the analyzed snapshot time, we check whether
the resolved version is vulnerably or not. To do so, we check
the advisories dataset for the versions that were available at
that snapshot point. If the resolved version is covered by the
advisories dataset, we label it as a vulnerable dependency
version. We skip the whole next step if the dependency
version has not been mentioned in any advisory, i.e., the
dependency version is not vulnerable.
Step 3. Identify threat levels of vulnerable versions.
Once we identify the vulnerable dependency versions at
the analyzed snapshot time, we classify each vulnerable
dependency version using one of the threat levels we de-
fined earlier (in Section 2.2), i.e., we find out the threat level
of each vulnerable dependency version. To do so, for each
vulnerable version, we compare its vulnerability discovery
(report) and publication time to the analyzed snapshot time.
As we stated previously (in Section 2.2), if the vulnerability
publication time of the vulnerable dependency version is
before the application’s snapshot time then we mark the
vulnerability as high threat vulnerability. If the vulnerability
of the dependency was not published but only discovered
(reported) before the application’s snapshot time, then we
mark it as medium. And finally, if it was neither published
nor discovered (reported) before the analyzed snapshot time
(i.e., no one knows about it at that snapshot time), then we
mark it as low.
In cases where more than one vulnerability affects the
vulnerable dependency version, we resort to a weakest link
approach (i.e., we label the vulnerable dependency version
with the highest threat level). For example, if we find that
the vulnerable version of the dependency is affected by two
vulnerabilities -one having low threat and another as high
threat, we label the vulnerable dependency version as high
at that snapshot time.
4.3 Replication Package
To facilitate verification and advancement of research in the
field, a replication package comprising the data used in our
study along with the analyses used in our study is publicly
available1.
5 CASE STUDY RESULTS
In this section, we present our case study results that answer
our 3 research questions (RQ). For each RQ, we motivate the
question, detail the approach used and present the results.
RQ1: How are the threat levels of vulnerable dependen-
cies distributed in the studied Node.js applications?
Motivation: Prior work showed that a significant amount
of application code comes from third party packages, and
a non-negligible amount of these packages are affected by
known security vulnerabilities [2]. However, we argue that
not all vulnerabilities should be treated equally. Hence, in
this RQ we would like to quantify how many of our studied
applications have at least one vulnerable dependency and
what the threat level of these vulnerable dependencies is.
Answering this question will help us understand the real
risk/threat of vulnerable packages on the software applica-
tions.
Approach: In order to perform an unbiased analysis, we
need to account for vulnerability discovery time. Prior work
showed that vulnerabilities in npm take on median 3 years
to be discovered and publicly announced [18]. As a conse-
quence, selecting snapshots of our applications in 2019 will
paint an incomplete picture, as most vulnerabilities recently
introduced in the package’s code would remain hidden for
a median of 3 years.
Since we collected the advisories dataset in May/June
2019, we chose to evaluate our applications as of May 2016
(3 years prior), which ensures that at least half the depen-
dency vulnerabilities introduced in the code are reported in
the current advisories dataset.
Then, we answer our RQ in two steps. First, we examine
if the selected snapshot of the application had at least one
dependency that contains a vulnerability (irrespective of
its threat level). Then, to determine the threat level of the
vulnerable dependencies in the examined applications, we
focus only on the set of applications that have at least one
vulnerable dependency using the methodology described
in Section 4.2. In the second step, we quantify the number
of vulnerable dependencies in the applications under each
threat level. We first check the percentage of overall vulner-
able dependencies in each application and illustrate their
distribution using a Boxplot. We further analyze the distri-
bution of these vulnerable dependencies across the threat
levels and plot it using three Boxplots, one for each threat
level. For example, an application could have 10% of its
1. http://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3837397
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Figure 3: Boxplots showing the distributions of the percentage
of overall vulnerable dependencies in the applications (left
boxplot), and how these percentages are distributed across
threat levels (right boxplot). N and M are the total number of
dependencies and the total number of vulnerable dependen-
cies, respectively.
dependencies as vulnerable at the analysed snapshot, and
such percentage (i.e., 10%) could be distributed across the
threat levels as follows: 25% of the vulnerable dependencies
are classified as low threat, 60% of them are classified as
medium, and 15% as high.
Results: Of the 6,673 studied applications 67.93% (4533 ap-
plications) depend on at least one vulnerable dependency.
The affected applications contains a total of 10,154 vulnera-
ble dependencies from 149 distinct vulnerable packages. The
149 packages comprises 23.21% of the overall vulnerable
packages in the npm advisories dataset.
Figure 3 shows the percentage of vulnerable dependen-
cies per application (left boxplot), and the distribution of
vulnerable dependencies at different threat levels (right box-
plot). It shows that, on median, 14.29% of the dependencies
in the affected application (i.e., applications with at least
1 vulnerable dependency) are vulnerable. Also, Figure 3
shows that such percentage of vulnerable dependencies (i.e.,
14.29%) is distributed as follows: 94.91% of the vulnerable
dependencies are classified as low threat vulnerabilities,
2.06% of them are classified as medium, and 3.03% are
classified as high.
Table 3: Mann-Whitney Test (p-value) and Cliff’s Delta (d) for
the different threat levels.
Threat Levels p-value Cliff’s Delta (d)
Low vs. Medium 2.2e-16 0.984 (large)
Low vs. High 2.2e-16 0.970 (large)
Medium vs. High 2.2e-16 0.335 (medium)
To statistically verify our observation, we perform a
one-sided non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test [20] by
comparing the distributions between the different threat
levels. Table 3 shows the p-values and effect size values. We
observe a statistically significant differences between (low
and medium), (low and high), (medium and high), at p-
value < 0.05 for all comparisons. Furthermore, we observe,
using Cliff’s delta [21], a large effect size for the differences
between low and medium, low and high. Also, we found
a medium effect size for the difference between medium
and high. This indicates that the differences between the
different threat levels are statistically significant.
Our findings show that 67.93% of the examined ap-
plications depend on at least one vulnerable package.
However, the vast majority (94.91%) of these depen-
dencies have low threat.
RQ2: How does the distribution of the threat levels
change as the studied applications evolve?
Motivation: Thus far, we have analyzed the vulnerability
threats of a single snapshot of each application in our
dataset. However, our findings may differ as the applica-
tions evolve. For example, a vulnerability with high threat
on a given day could have had low threat the week before.
Hence, in this RQ we would like to determine whether
our results generalize to different historical snapshots in the
application’s development lifetime. Such an evolutionary
examination allows us to discover whether the trend of the
threat levels changes across different stages of an applica-
tion’s lifetime.
Approach: Since the different applications are of different
lifespans, we want to find a measure that makes comparing
them feasible. To do so, we use the number of commits as a
way to divide the applications into different intervals. Since
commit frequency and time between commits vary from
one application to another, we normalize the applications by
segmenting the lifetimes of each application into five equal
intervals (each containing 20% of an application’s lifetime
by time in days), take one snapshot at each interval, then
analyze it. Although this might seem like a straightforward
task, it poses some challenges, since we have a large appli-
cations dataset and the package.json file in them is updated
significantly over the application’s lifetime. For this analysis,
we only consider the affected applications identified in RQ1.
The last snapshot (at 100%) is the same snapshot that we
analyzed in RQ1 (i.e., May 2016).
Table 4: The percentage of vulnerable applications at different
historical snapshots.
Snapshot VulnerableApplications
20% 55.31%
40% 58.17%
60% 60.87%
80% 63.03%
100% 67.93%
Results: Table 4 shows the percentage of applications that
have at least one vulnerable dependency for the 5 analyzed
snapshots across their lifetime. We observe that the per-
centage of vulnerable applications steadily increases each
snapshot and varies between 55.31 - 67.93% in the studied
applications.
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Figure 4: Boxplots showing the percentage of overall vulnerable dependencies and their distribution in each threat level over the
studied snapshots. N and M are the total number of dependencies and the total number of vulnerable dependencies, respectively.
Figure 4 illustrates the distributions of the percentage
of vulnerable dependencies at each threat level over the
studied snapshots. The total number of dependencies (N)
and the total number of vulnerable dependencies (M) in the
studied applications are shown at the bottom of Figure 4.
The raw numbers of the dependencies show that the total
number of dependencies increases over time, and so does
the raw number of vulnerable dependencies.
From Figure 4, we observe that the affected applications
depend on vulnerable dependencies at an earlier stage (i.e.,
at 20%) of their lifetime. However, we also observe that the
trend observed in RQ1 remains the same, i.e., the overall
percentage of vulnerable dependencies ranges between
14.29% - 14.68%. Also, the majority of the vulnerabilities
have a low threat level, followed by high and medium
threat. To sum up, our analysis shows that all trends
observed in RQ1 also hold at different stages of the
applications, albeit the raw number of dependencies does
increase.
As applications evolve, the overall number of vulner-
able dependencies is increasing, however, the median
percentage of vulnerable dependencies remains mostly
constant. Moreover, the majority of vulnerabilities
they face remain as low threat vulnerabilities, as these
applications evolve.
RQ3: Who is responsible for the dependence on high
threat vulnerable dependencies?
Motivation: In the previous research questions, we found
that the majority of affected dependencies are impacted
by low threat vulnerabilities, throughout applications de-
velopment history. However, a sizeable number of projects
depend on high threat dependencies, which are the most im-
portant. This means that those applications depend on vul-
nerable versions of dependencies even after the vulnerabil-
ity reports have been discovered (reported)-and-published.
In such cases, the developers of the applications could know
about the presence of the vulnerability in the dependency,
and hence, should avoid using that vulnerable version, if
a fix is available. Specifically, we want to know who is
to blame - the package maintainers for not providing a
Table 5: The percentage of vulnerabilities caused by the lack
of available fix patch (Package-to-blame) vs caused by the
lack of dependencies update (Application-to-blame), over the
applications snapshot.
Snapshot Package-to-blame Application-to-blame
20% 12.06% 87.94%
40% 9.52% 90.48%
60% 11.91% 88.09%
80% 12.43% 87.57%
100% 9.24% 90.76%
version that fixes a known vulnerability - or the applica-
tion maintainers for not keeping their applications up-to-
date. Answering this will help us pinpoint the causes for
high threat vulnerabilities in npm applications and develop
further strategies to solve this problem.
Approach: To perform our investigation and answer who
is responsible for the high threat vulnerabilities in appli-
cations, we use the same method to determine high threat
vulnerabilities as presented in the first two RQs.
For each high threat vulnerable dependency, we check
the availability of a safe version of the package for the
vulnerability at the analyzed snapshot time. Depending on
such availability our analysis has one of two outcomes:
• Package-to-blame: if at the analyzed snapshot, no safe
version has been provided by the package maintainers
for a publicly known vulnerability. As the publication
of a vulnerability comes after a period of 45 days, we
consider the package maintainers the responsible for
the high threat vulnerability in applications.
• Application-to-blame: if there is already a released safe
version of the vulnerable package but the application
continues to rely on an (old) version with a publicly
known vulnerability. Application developers should
monitor their dependencies and update to releases
without known vulnerabilities, hence, we consider the
application maintainers as responsible for the high
threat vulnerability.
Results: Table 5 shows the percentage of high threat vul-
nerabilities based on our responsibility analysis. From Ta-
ble 5, we observe that for high threat vulnerabilities, the
application is to blame in 90.76% of the cases at the last
snapshot (i.e., 100%). That means that in 9 out of 10 cases
the high threat vulnerability had an available fix, but the
applications did not update their dependencies to receive
the last fix patch. Note that this observation holds over all
snapshots, with percentages of application-to-blame cases
varying from 87.94% to 90.76%.
Therefore, and perhaps counter-intuitively, high threat
vulnerabilities do not exist because packages have unfixed
vulnerabilities, rather the real cause is the fact that these
applications fail to keep up or at least to inform themselves
well enough about a given dependency version. Hence, a
major implication of our study is that application develop-
ers need to take updates pushed from their dependencies
seriously, or at least actively track their dependencies, since
those can lead to very serious effects.
It is important to note that we do not argue about the
severity of the vulnerabilities, but rather their likelihood
threat of being exploited. Hence, a low severity vulnerability
can be very dangerous if everyone knows how to exploit
it (high threat level according to our classification). The
inverse is also true in that a high severity vulnerability can
have a very low chance of being exploited if no one knows
about its existence (low threat level).
Our findings show that applications not updating
their dependencies, are the main cause of high threat
(more than 87%) vulnerabilities.
6 DISCUSSION
In this section, we first address the cost of migrating depen-
dencies for a safer version (Section 6.1). Then, we discuss
how our findings of vulnerable dependencies may lead to
implications to researchers and practitioners (Section 6.2).
6.1 Security Migration Cost
Developers of Node.js applications may use dynamic ver-
sioning constraints if they want to install the latest version
of a dependency, allowing them to get the latest updates
for security fixes of the package. In fact, npm adopts a
semantic version scheme [19], where package maintainers
are encouraged to specify the extent of their updates in three
different levels: 1) patch release, which indicates backward
compatible bug fixes, 2) minor release, which indicates back-
wards compatible new features and 3) major release, which
informs developers of backwards incompatible changes in
the package release. While our study (RQ3) showed that
90.76% of high-threat vulnerabilities have a safe version
available for application maintainers (at the snapshot 100%),
we manually inspected the fixed versions and the applica-
tions version constraints and found that in 43.07% of the
cases, the fix is only available in another major release.
For instance, an application depends on P:1.0.0, and the
fix patch was only released for a major version 2.0.0 and
onwards. Hence, to benefit from a fix patch in such a case,
developers are required to upgrade their dependencies at
the risk of breaking their own code, since a new major
release has breaking changes compared to the version the
application depends on. This imposes significant migration
costs, especially for large projects that depend on dozens
of packages. Furthermore, this shows that using dynamic
versioning at the level of patch and minor releases (as
recommended by npm) does not completely prevent high
threat level vulnerabilities for affecting Node.js applications.
6.2 Implications
Implications to researchers. Several studies have addressed
the problem of vulnerabilities in software libraries [5], [18].
Our study, however, complements previous studies by an-
alyzing the risks of vulnerable dependencies in the Node.js
applications, aggregating the vulnerability lifecycle through
the threat level metric.
Researchers can use our empirical evidence to better
understand the risks Node.js applications face due to their
high reliance on dependencies. Our results show that most
vulnerable dependencies found in a application snapshot
have a low risk of being exploited when considering the
lifecycle of vulnerabilities and how applications update
their dependencies. Our results also show that the time
element is crucial to understanding the threat of vulnerable
dependencies in applications.
Hence, a major implication of our study for researchers
is that not all vulnerabilities are equal, and should not be
treated and analyzed as such. Research needs to account
for more than the existence of vulnerabilities to draw more
meaningful analyses regarding software security, particu-
larly for applications in software ecosystems where the level
of dependency continues to increase. Research can use our
threat-level approach to provide a more refined picture
when reporting the impact of vulnerabilities. Researchers
can also reuse our approach to help them identify and
classify vulnerable dependencies in the applications (in
Section 4.2).
Furthermore, more studies across ecosystems are
necessary to get a broader perspective on the threat
level of vulnerability dependencies. npm is one of the
largest ecosystems and since applications depend on
an increasingly high number of packages [12], Node.js
applications may be subjected to higher risk of vulnerable
dependencies. Further investigation could unveil if this
pattern holds in other ecosystems.
Implications to practitioners. Our results revealed impor-
tant takeaways for software practitioners. First, vulnerable
dependencies are common, 67.93% of the studied Node.js
applications had at least one vulnerable dependency at the
last studied snapshot. Practitioners need to be in constant
alert to update their dependencies and tools that increase
awareness of vulnerabilities, such as Dependabot [22] and
npm audit [23] are evermore crucial for the safety of soft-
ware applications, especially because they warn developers
as soon as the vulnerability becomes of a high threat level.
Second, practitioners also need to account for the threat
level of a vulnerability to have a more correct understand-
ing of software vulnerabilities in software ecosystems. Our
method of analysis can also be used by developers to iden-
tify packages that more often raise the threat level in their
applications. Also, while vulnerabilities are widespread in
open-source packages in the npm, in most cases package
maintainers issue a fix patch for their vulnerability as soon
as it becomes public, which is crucial to mitigate the chances
of having a vulnerability exploited and cause potential harm
to end-users and application maintainers.
Third, our study showed that developers are in need
of more tools that go beyond simply warning them of a
published vulnerability. For example, they need tools to help
them understand: 1) the costs of migrating to a safer version
and whether it is possible to fix a vulnerability without
breaking their code, 2) the frequency in which certain de-
pendencies have become vulnerable in the past, in order to
grab the threats of depending on such packages and better
plan their project maintenance, 3) history of all vulnerable
dependencies of their application in order to understand
the frequency and the duration in which their application
became at the risk of a high threat vulnerability in the past.
Packages that do not update their code to address reported
vulnerabilities incur in a high risk for applications that use
them and should be avoided by critical applications.
7 RELATED WORK
The work most related to our study falls into two main
categories - studies on software ecosystems and studies
on security vulnerabilities in packages. In the following,
we discuss the related work and reflect on how the work
compares with ours.
7.1 Software Ecosystems
A plethora of recent work focused on software ecosystems.
Several works compare different ecosystems. For example,
Decan et al. [12] empirically compared the evolution of
7 popular package ecosystem using different aspects, e.g.,
growth, changeability, resuability, and fragility. They ob-
served that the number of packages in those ecosystems is
growing over time, showing their increasing importance.
Other work focused specifically on npm [24], [25], [26].
For example, Fard et al. [24] examined the evolution of
dependencies within an npm project, and showed that there
is a heavily interdependence, with the average number of
dependencies being 6 and growing over time. Wittern et
al. [26] investigated the evolution of npm using metrics
such as dependencies between packages, download count,
and usage count in JavaScript applications. They found that
packages in the npm ecosystem are steadily growing. Such
amounts of packages make the spread and discovery of
vulnerabilities much worse, given the heavy dependence on
such packages and the potential security problems in those
packages.
Other studies pointed out the fragility of software
ecosystems and provided insights on the challenges ap-
plication developers face. For example, Bogart et al. [27],
[28] examined the Eclipse, CRAN, and npm ecosystems,
focusing on what practices cause API breakages. They found
that a main reason for breaking changes are the updates of
a dependency. This finding may explain why application
developers are hesitant to update and explain why we see
high threat vulnerabilities impacting applications that do
not update in time.
Our study differs from the prior work since we focus
on the threat level of dependency vulnerabilities in Node.js
applications. Moreover, we examine how this threat level
changes as applications evolve and examine the reason
that high threat dependency vulnerabilities exist. That said,
much of the aforementioned work motivated us to study
npm and focus on examining vulnerabilities in application
dependencies.
7.2 Security Vulnerabilities in Dependencies/Packages
Several works in the literature studied vulnerabilities that
come from dependencies [29], [30], [31], [32], [33]. For ex-
ample, Di Penta et al. [29] and Pham et al. [30] conducted
empirical studies to analyze the evolution of vulnerabil-
ities in source code, and found that most vulnerabilities
are recurring due to software code reuse or libraries (i.e.,
dependencies). Cox et al. [31] evaluated “dependency fresh-
ness” to understand the relationship between outdated de-
pendencies and vulnerabilities using industry benchmarks,
and found that vulnerabilities were four times as much
likely to have existed in outdated systems than in updated
systems. Relative studies by Massacci et al. [32] and Derr et
al. [33] are in line with [31]. In general, they both reported
that vulnerabilities appeared commonly in non-maintained
code and old versions, and this could be fixed by just an
update to a newer version. Our study complements these
studies by examining the threat of these vulnerabilities in
the dependent applications.
More specifically, vulnerabilities that affect packages in
ecosystems have been studied broadly [4], [17]. For ex-
ample, Kula et al. [17] analyzed the Maven ecosystem on
more than 4,000 GitHub projects that correspond to 850,000
library migrations, and found that projects were heavily
dependent on these libraries, and most projects (i.e. 81.5%)
had outdated libraries. The study also mentioned (based
on interviews conducted with developers) that developers
do not update dependencies, and 69% of the interviewed
developers tend to be not aware of their vulnerable de-
pendencies. Pashchenko et al. [4] studied the vulnerability
impact of 200 open-source Java libraries commonly used in
SAP [34] organisation, and found that 20% of the vulner-
able dependencies are not deployed, and hence, they are
not exploitable in practice. Moreover, they found that the
majority of the vulnerable dependencies (81%) can be fixed
by a simple upgrade to a newer safe version, suggesting
that software development companies have to allocate their
audit tools correctly.
Other recent work focused on analyzing vulnerabili-
ties in the npm ecosystem. For example, Hejderup’s [35]
analysed only 19 vulnerable packages and found that the
number of vulnerabilities in them is growing over time.
Similarly, Decan et al. [18] analyzed the vulnerabilities in
the npm ecosystem and found that the number of vul-
nerabilities is growing over time. Also, they reported that
it takes a long time to discover vulnerabilities that affect
npm packages. Our study complements this study by ana-
lyzing the risks of vulnerable dependencies in the Node.js
applications (not addressed by the study [18]), aggregating
the vulnerability lifecycle through the threat level metric.
A recent study by Zapata et al. [5] assessed the danger of
having vulnerabilities in dependent libraries by analyzing
function calls of the vulnerable functions. They manually
analyzed 60 projects that depend on vulnerabilities, and
found that 73.3% of them were actually safe because they
did not make use of the vulnerable functionality of their
dependencies, showing that there is a considerable overesti-
mation on previous reports. Our study identifies yet another
source of overestimation by including a time-based analy-
sis into a large and comprehensive set of applications (i.e.,
6,673 Node.js applications). Zimmermann et al. [36] studied
the security threat of the npm ecosystem dependencies by
mainly analysing the maintainers role and responsibilities
for vulnerable packages. They mainly observed that a very
small number of maintainers’ accounts (i.e., 20 accounts)
could be used to inject malicious code into thousands of
npm packages, a problem that has been increasing over
time. Zerouali et al. [37] studied npm vulnerable packages in
Docker containers, and found that they are common in the
containers, suggesting that Docker containers should keep
their npm dependencies updated.
To assess the impact of vulnerable dependencies in the
dependent Java applications, Plate et al. [38] proposed an
approach that provides a fine-grained assessment of the
vulnerabilities that affect dependencies in dependent Java
applications. In particular, the approach first determines
whether or not the application makes use of the library
that is known to be vulnerable. Then, the approach tries
to determine whether or not the application executes the
fragment of the dependency where the vulnerable code
is located. Furthermore, Ponta et al. [39] built upon their
previous approach in [38] to generalize their vulnerability
detection approach by using static and dynamic analysis
to determine whether the vulnerable code in the library is
reachable through the application call paths. Their proposed
approach is implemented in a tool called, Vulas, which is an
official software used by SAP to scan its Java code.
Our study focuses on analyzing the threat of npm vul-
nerabilities in dependencies, which affected applications
that rely on them. In many ways, our study complements
the related work since, (1) instead of studying security vul-
nerabilities that exist in packages, we particularly focus on
the threat of such vulnerable packages by real-world open
source applications; (2) we provide a threat classification for
software vulnerabilities based on their lifetime, and we use
our classification and perform an empirical study on Node.js
applications.
8 THREATS TO VALIDITY
Construct Validity considers the relationship between the-
ory and observation, in case the measured variables do not
measure the actual factors. Our dataset contains 654 vul-
nerabilities available in the npm advisories dataset. There
might be other vulnerable packages that have been discov-
ered but not yet reported. However, we leveraged up-to-
date dataset from npm advisories, which we believe con-
tains complete information about the vulnerable packages
reported to them.
With respect to the affected dependencies, we only take
into consideration production dependencies (i.e., dependen-
cies that are required to install and run the application).
We ignore other types (e.g., development dependencies),
because they have no direct impact on the production en-
vironment.
This paper only considered direct dependencies. Our
results may vary if indirect dependencies are considered,
however, due to computation requirements, we focused on
the direct dependencies of applications. In the future, we
plan to expand our technique to consider indirect depen-
dencies when considering the threat of vulnerabilities.
We did not consider whether the vulnerable
functionality in the package actually affects the application,
i.e., whether the applications uses the vulnerable code of
the package. Considering this would be challenging, since
our dataset is composed of thousands of applications. That
said, our analysis is in line with prior work in the area
of software ecosystems, which also examine dependencies
in the package.json file to associate packages to applications.
External Validity is related to the generalizability of our
findings. Our study is based on Node.js applications that use
npm. Hence our results may not generalize to applications
written in other languages. However, the key concepts and
design of our study can be applied on other package depen-
dency networks. Although npm is a single case, examples
from the past have shown that individual cases contribute
to the building of a general empirical evidence software
engineering [40].
Our dataset contains 6,673 JavaScript applications that
use npm packages. Our dataset might be considered small
when it is compared to the whole population of JavaScript
applications. However, our dataset is of high quality, since
we filtered out applications that are immature and have less
development history, by using the filtering criteria used by
Kalliamvakou et al. [16].
9 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Our study examined software vulnerabilities in npm de-
pendencies with respect to their threat on the dependent
Node.js applications. First, we defined three levels of threat
for software vulnerabilities in dependencies based on their
lifecycle and performed an empirical study on 6,673 Node.js
applications to assess how threatening the vulnerable de-
pendencies that exist in these applications really are. Our
findings indicate that the vast majority of vulnerable de-
pendencies have low threat on applications that depend
upon them. Although 67.93% of the examined applications
depend on at least one vulnerable package, 94.91% of the
vulnerable dependencies are classified as having low threat.
Moreover, we examined why these applications end up
depending on high threat vulnerable versions of these de-
pendencies. We observed that, in the case of high threat
vulnerabilities, the applications are to blame in more than
87% of the cases, i.e., a fix for the vulnerable dependency is
available but not patched in the application. These findings
show that the assumption that all vulnerabilities that exist in
packages will impact applications the same way is not cor-
rect and that vulnerable packages are not always to blame.
Finally, our further analysis shows that all of the observed
trends hold across the different stages of the applications’
lifetime.
In the future, we plan to further elaborate on the impact
of the various threat vulnerabilities on the applications’
functionality level. Other data sources can be added to
enhance the risk assessment, e.g., severity, exploitability, etc.
We also aim to examine if our findings hold for applications
written in different programming languages.
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